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Against Residency Requirements
Michael J. Pittst

INTRODUCTION

The topic for discussion at this Forum is "Does Election Law
Serve the Electorate?" Were I pressed to answer this question
from a global perspective, my answer would be "generally, no."
There are a myriad of ways in which election law does not serve
the electorate, most of which relate back to what may be the
biggest flaw with American democracy-the fact that it is
predominantly structured by political partisans whose primary
interest seems to be to their own (or their parties') well-being
rather than an obligation to developing a system that works best
for the overall electorate.'
My goal in this article is to establish that residency
requirements are one aspect of election law that does not serve
the electorate and should be eliminated as a condition for
obtaining and holding elected office. What I mean by a
"residency requirement" is any law (whether it be a federal or
state constitutional provision, a state statute, or a local
ordinance) that requires a candidate or officeholder to be a
resident of a particular geographic area (whether it be a political
entity, such as a state, county, or city, or whether it be a
particular electoral district-e.g., a single-member districtwithin a political entity). In a nutshell, my view is that such
requirements represent barriers to electoral competition that
only minimally benefit the electorate and instead primarily
serve the interests of incumbent politicians of all stripes.

t Professor of Law and Dean's Fellow, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law. Special thanks to Research and Instruction Librarian Susan deMaine for
library assistance and to Jessica Dickinson for research assistance. Thanks to Josh
Douglas, Max Huffman, Chris Mueller, and the participants in The University of Chicago
Legal Forum for very helpful thoughts and comments.
' I include judicial actors in the mix of political partisans-though they tend to be
less overtly partisan than other actors in our democratic system.
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In this article, I will proceed as follows. Part I discusses
various types of candidate residency requirements, explores the
possible benefits of such requirements, examines the costs, and
generally contends that residency requirements should be
eliminated because the costs outweigh the benefits. Part II
theorizes about why residency requirements persist as part of
the electoral landscape and briefly discusses ways in which
residency requirements might be eliminated or scaled back. 2
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS

Residency requirements should be eliminated. In this part, I
define what I mean when using the term "residency
requirement."
Importantly,
my
critique
of
residency
requirements goes beyond requirements for candidates running
for office and encompasses residency requirements for
candidates actually serving in office. After defining the scope of
my critique, this part examines the potential benefits of
residency requirements that have been recognized by courts
dealing with challenges to these requirements as a condition for
running for office (which are also commonly known as
"durational residency requirements"). This part then evaluates a
few other potential benefits of residency requirements before
considering who residency requirements are primarily meant to
protect-the electorate-and whether the electorate needs such
protection. Finally, this part discusses the costs of residency
requirements and also tackles special considerations related to
residency requirements as a condition for continuing to hold
elected office.
A.

Defining "Residency Requirements"

As this is The University of Chicago Legal Forum, it makes
sense to begin a discussion of what constitutes a residency
requirement with one of the most recent prominent examples of
2 Somewhat surprisingly, it does not appear that any commentator has ever waged
an extended, broad-based attack on candidate residency requirements in the law review
literature. The most extensive recent discussion of candidate residency requirements is a
well-written student note that uses a judicial decision involving Chicago Mayor Rahm
Emanuel as a case study for developing principles to improve the implementation of such
requirements while only devoting about a paragraph to the notion that such
requirements be totally eliminated. See Gavin J. Dow, Note, Mr. Emanuel Returns from
Washington: DurationalResidence Requirements and Election Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1515, 1539 (2013).
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a dispute as to the residence of a candidate-Rahm Emanuel's
bid to become Mayor of Chicago in 2011.3 The Illinois Municipal
Code required a municipal candidate to reside in the
municipality for at least one year prior to election. 4 Some
Chicago residents alleged that Emanuel did not meet the oneyear residency requirement because he had moved from Chicago
to Washington, DC to be Chief of Staff for President Obama. 5 At
one point in the proceedings, an Illinois appellate court
determined that Emanuel did not meet the residency
requirement.6 Ultimately, though, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that Emanuel complied with the statutory requirement of a
one-year residency prior to the election.'
The ordinance involved in the Emanuel case is not uniquerequirements for candidates to be residents of a particular
jurisdiction exist throughout the country. The United States
Constitution mandates that members of Congress be "an
inhabitant of that state" when elected. 8 The Constitution also
renders a citizen ineligible to be President unless that person
has "been fourteen years a resident within the United States."9
To be eligible to serve as Governor of Indiana, a person must
have been a resident of the State for five years prior to
election.1 0 To be eligible to serve as a member of the Georgia
General Assembly, a person must have been a citizen of Georgia
for at least two years." To be eligible to serve as a Supreme
3 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Let Rahm Run!, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011), available
at
http: /www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/jurisprudence/201 1/0 1/let rahm
run.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/86QR-YUQC.
65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(a) (2013).
5 Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of the City of Chi., 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053-54
(111. 2011).
6 Id. at 1055 (citing Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of the City if Chi., 942
N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. 2011)).
Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1066 (reversing appellate court judgment).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
3 (Senate). See generally Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications,
90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing constitutional residency requirements for
federal office). The United States Constitution also mandates that members of Congress
be citizens of the United States for a certain amount of time before being elected. U.S.
CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 2 (House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senate).
This article takes no position on whether United States citizenship should be a
requirement for holding office at any level of government.
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
IND. CONST. art. 5, § 7.
'o
n GA. CONST. art. III, § II, para. 3. In addition, members of the Georgia General
Assembly must have been "legal residents of the territory embraced by the district from
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Court Justice in Kentucky, a person must have been a resident
of that Commonwealth for two years prior to taking office. 12 To
be eligible to serve as Mayor of Oakland, California, a person
must have been a city resident for at least thirty days prior to
the issuance of nomination papers. 13 Suffice to say, that whether
it be at the federal, state, or local level, requirements that
elected officials reside in a particular jurisdiction for some
amount of time prior to assuming office (a.k.a. "durational
residency requirements") are widespread.14
The previous examples all involve a requirement that
elected officials reside in a particular jurisdiction, but my
definition of residency requirements for purposes of this article
is more broad-based. For instance, the Illinois Municipal Code
requires a candidate for municipal office to be a qualified voter
of the municipality-which amounts to a residency requirement
because there is usually a durational residency requirement to
qualify to vote.15 Moreover, the Illinois Municipal Code also
requires candidates for alderman of a ward to be resident of
their ward for at least a year.1 6 In addition, Illinois municipal
officials can vacate their office by a "more than temporary
removal of residence from the municipality." 7 And Illinois is not
unique in these requirements, as many of the cases cited
which elected for at least one year." Id. See also N.J. CONST. art. IV, § I, para. 2
(requiring members of the New Jersey Senate to have been a resident of the state for
four years and members of the General Assembly to have been a resident of the state for
two years).
12 KY. CONST. § 122.
13 Elections
and
Compliance,
City
of
Oakland,
available
at
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/CityClerk/s/ElectionsandCompliance/index.
htm, archived at http://perma.cc/6JLK-J9UG.
14 Dow, supra note 2, at 1516 (noting that durational residency
requirements are
not "unique" and that "[m]any states impose some form of durational residence
requirement for at least some elected state officials, including governors, legislators,
judges, and mayors"); In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen.
Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 693 (N.J. 2012) ("[allmost every state has enacted durational
residency requirements for state legislators" (quoting In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen.
Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 48 A.3d 1164, 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2012)).
15 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(a) (2013). See also Frami v. Ponto, 255 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967
(W.D. Wis. 2003) ("A registration requirement is a de facto residency requirement."). To
be clear, my only concern with a person being required to be a qualified voter as a
condition of running for office in a particular place relates to any geographic requirement
rather than with, say, the age or citizenship requirements necessary to be a qualified
voter. However, while beyond the scope of this article, my general inclination is that we
should dispense with all candidate qualifications.
'6 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(c) (2013).
17 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-50(c)(1) (2008).
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throughout this article involve, for example, the continuing need
to reside in a particular district within a jurisdiction.18
In essence, the concern for purposes of this discussion is any
law (constitutional, statutory, or otherwise) that either explicitly
requires or implicitly requires (such as the requirement to be a
qualified voter) a candidate or officeholder to reside in a
particular geographic area as a condition of running for office,
attaining election, or continuing to hold office. 19 My basic
argument will be that such requirements, while widespread, are
of little utility and their enforcement likely only stifles electoral
competition to the detriment of voters.
residency
deconstructing
before
point
last
One
requirements. It may seem like residency requirements are not
much of a problem. You might reasonably ask how often a
residency requirement prevents a viable candidate from running
for office. The answer to the question is, in many ways,
unknowable, but there seem to be plenty of cases (see the
ensuing discussion) where residency requirements play a role in
excluding otherwise qualified candidates. 20 In addition to the
1s See, e.g., Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1981) (one-year requirement
for residency in a particular ward for its city council seat); In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011
Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 692 (N.J. 2012) (one-year
requirement for residency in a particular district for its General Assembly seat).
' There is a concomitant issue as to how residency requirements should be
implemented. Put differently, various potential legal standards exist for determining
who is or who is not a resident of a particular geographic area. The concern of this
article, however, lies in the predecessor question of whether to have residency
requirements at all. For a discussion of various legal standards for determining
residency, see Dow, supra note 2, at 1517-19.
20 See Jerry H. Goldfeder & Myrna Pdrez, The Governor Challenges His Opponent's
Residency, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 2014, at 3. ("[Ellection trials such as this [involving
residency] are fairly common during late July and August."). One does not need to look
very far on the Internet to find that this issue arises often and in many places around
the nation. While writing a draft of this article during the summer of 2014, issues of
residency requirements arose in, among other places, a Louisiana Senate race, the New
York Governor's race, with a Los Angeles city councilman, in a Wayne County
(Michigan) contest, in Knoxville, Tennessee, and in La Porte County (Indiana). Marlon
A. Walker, Warren Evans' Candidacy for County Exec Challenged over Residency,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jul. 22, 2014; Stan Maddux, Candidacy Challenged on Basis of
Residency, SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (Jul. 17, 2014, 6:18 PM), available at
http://www.southbendtribune.com/news/candidacy-challenged-on-basis-ofat
archived
residency/article_3f2ae2f6-OeOO-11e4-9786-0017a43b2370.html,
http://perma.cclUR9V-TFM7; Jimmy Vielkind, Challenge to Teachout Focuses on
available at
PM),
3:14
2014,
28,
N.Y.
(Jul.
CAPITAL
Residency,
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2014/07/8549782/challenge-teachoutfocuses-residency, archived at http://perma.cc/US4X-S2VQ; Alarcon Prosecution Sends
the Right Message to Other Politicians, DAs, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 23, 2014, 6:24 PM),
available at http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-alarcon-conviction-voter-
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actual cases involving residency requirement challenges, it is
likely many candidates are deterred from even filing papers
because of their failure to meet residency requirements. Put
simply, a potential candidate's knowledge of a lack of compliance
with a residency requirement will lead that potential candidate
to not even attempt to run. In short, residency requirements are
not trivial.
B.

Assessing Benefits and Costs of Residency Requirements

Courts routinely uphold residency requirements against
federal and state constitutional challenges. In doing so, they
most often invoke three benefits of residency laws. In this
section, the benefits most frequently cited by the courts are
discussed first. Then, other benefits of residency requirements
are considered. Finally, after discussing the benefits of residency
requirements, I evaluate their costs.
1. Benefits of residency requirements frequently identified
by courts.
The courts often articulate three benefits of candidate
residency requirements: the ability of candidates to understand
the problems and needs of their constituencies, the need for
voters to have adequate time to assess the candidates, and the
prevention of political carpet bagging.2 1
Before discussing these three justifications, it's helpful to
residency
hypothetical
involving
present
a
concrete
requirements to aid as a springboard for discussion. Let's say
Jack Donaghy is a Republican corporate executive from New
York City. Donaghy, though, is disenchanted with New York
fraud-perjury-acqui-20140724-story.html?track=rss, archived at http://perma.cc/KS4VZXYG; Jack McElroy, Home is Where the Candidate is, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Jul.
27, 2014, 5:59 PM), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/opinion/columnists/jackmcelroy-home-is-where-the-candidate-is88061917, archived at http://perma.ccfZU5WJHYD; Julie O'Donoghue, Judge Throws out Suit Challenging Mary Landrieu's
Residency, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (Sept. 5, 2014, 10:34 AM), available at
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/09/landrieu_
residency-courtcase.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/XX9N-7RK3.
21
See, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (D.N.H. 1974) ("The three
principal state interests served by the durational residency requirement are: first, to
ensure that the candidate is familiar with his constituency; second, to ensure that the
voters have been thoroughly exposed to the candidate; and third, to prevent political
carpetbagging."). See also Barrow v. City of Detroit Election Comm'n, 836 N.W.2d 498,
510 (Mich. App. 2013).
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City and desires to enter local politics elsewhere. So he decides
to run for city council in Pawnee, Indiana, a predominantly
rural, Republican, farming community in west-central Indiana
where his opponent will be long-time Pawnee resident Leslie
Knope. Pawnee, though, has a city ordinance that prohibits
Donaghy from running in Pawnee's next city council election
because Pawnee has a one-year residency requirement that
Donaghy cannot meet. What would be the benefit of the Pawnee
ordinance that prohibits Donaghy from running?
a. Candidateunderstandingof constituency.
One possible benefit of Pawnee's residency requirement is
that it helps ensure candidates are familiar with the problems
and needs of Pawnee's people-a government interest (i.e., a
benefit) frequently cited by courts. 22 In our hypothetical
example, Donaghy has been living in New York where the
primary issue may be racial profiling. 23 In Pawnee, however, the
primary concern may be whether to build a public park called
Pawnee Commons. 24 If this is the case, Donaghy's lack of an
Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ky. 1998) ("The state has an interest
in ensuring that a judge [running for election] is familiar with the problems and needs of
the people of his district."); Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (D.N.J. 2001)
(acknowledging argument that a residency requirement "allows a candidate the
opportunity to become familiar with the issues and concerns that are important to the
people he or she seeks to represent"); In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office
of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 699 (N.J. 2012) ("[residency requirements] ensure
that the candidate can become familiar with the constituency and the issues facing the
people to be represented."); Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Alaska 1974) (noting
that residency requirements assure that candidates "reside in the state a sufficient time
to gain an understanding of the history and geography of the state and the needs and
problems of its residents"); MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.
Nev. 1993) (noting that residency requirements "foster [| candidates who better
understand the issues and problems" of the jurisdiction); Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d
461, 466 (Mo. 2002) ("The purpose of residency statutes is to ensure that governmental
officials are sufficiently connected to their constituents to serve them with sensitivity
and understanding."); State ex rel. Brown v. Summit County Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d
1256, 1259 (Ohio 1989) (noting that the purpose of a residency requirement is so that
candidates "have the opportunity to know the customs and mores of the people");
Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1971) ("[C]andidates for ... office
must . .. understand all the local problems, [and] know the people of the
community. . ."); Woodward v. City of Deerfield Beach, 538 F.2d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir.
1976) (residency requirements are "necessary to guarantee the election of responsible,
knowledgeable city commissioners").
23 Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2013), availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-friskat
archived
practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html?pagewanted=all& r=0,
http://perma.cc/G6X3-JGHK.
24 See generally Parks and Recreation: Season 5 (NBC television broadcast 201222
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immediate geographic connection to Pawnee may lead to his
having only limited knowledge of the issues facing those he
seeks to represent. Put simply, the Pawnee ordinance will
provide the benefit of better-qualified candidates because
candidates who have resided in Pawnee will have more
knowledge about the issues facing Pawnee.
Let me concede that such a benefit exists-that candidates
who reside in closer geographic proximity are likely to better
understand the issues of that geographic area. Put more
concretely, that long-time Pawnee resident Leslie Knope would
have more knowledge of the issues facing Pawnee than longtime New York resident Jack Donaghy. But the question is not
whether any benefit exists. The question is how much of a
benefit exists and whether such a benefit outweighs the costs of
a residency requirement. 25 The benefit of a more knowledgeable
candidate due to a residency requirement is slight and does not
outweigh the costs of a residency requirement.
The first reason why the benefit is slight is that residency is
being used as a proxy for knowledge of the issues, but residency
is an imperfect proxy. An intrepid Jack Donaghy from New York
may have just as much, if not more, knowledge of (and the
capacity to resolve) the issues facing Pawnee than persons who
have lived there for several years (or at least as long as
mandated by the residency requirement). 26 As one federal
appellate court noted:
[A] two year resident of ...
[the city can] hold public
office regardless of his lack of knowledge of the
governmental problems of the city. On the other hand,
[the residency requirement] excludes more recent
arrivals who have had experience in local government
elsewhere or who have made diligent efforts to become
well acquainted with the municipality. 27

2013).
Part I.B.4. addresses costs.
Of course, no one in Pawnee has a greater knowledge of the issues than Leslie
Knope, but there may be far less knowledgeable persons who meet the residency
requirement.
27 Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883, 885 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Bolanowski v.
Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Mich. 1971) ("It requires little imagination to conceive
of an adult citizen of the City . . . who has lived his entire life there without taking any
interest whatsoever in municipal problems, and who would thus not fit the articulated
25

26
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durational
In short, while some connection may exist between
residency
requirements
and
knowledge,
it's
a
tenuous connection.
Moreover, in modern society a candidate seeking office can
easily obtain information. Indeed, the notion that a person
residing in one geographic area cannot have knowledge about
the issues in another geographic area seems to come from an
antiquated notion of how information can be obtained. Perhaps
in a bygone era, it was necessary to hang out at the local
barbershop or have the newspaper boy deliver the local paper to
your home to acquire knowledge of issues facing a community.
However, in the Internet era, it's far, far, far easier to gather
information and knowledge about a polity than ever before.2 8 If
Donaghy wants to know what's happening in Pawnee, the
Pawnee Journaland Pawnee Sun 29 are likely only a few Internet
clicks (and perhaps a paid subscription) away, information about
Pawnee's government can probably be found on its website, 30
and he can probably easily become Facebook friends with local
community organizers. In short, it's hard to believe that in our
current information age, geography matters all that much in
terms of a candidate's understanding of the issues and needs of
a constituency.

qualifications sought to be insured by the [three-year residency] requirement. It is also
easy to conceive of a person who may have lived in the City for two and one-half years
and gathered sufficient knowledge to be able to have a good understanding of all aspects
of the municipality's difficulties."); Thompson v. Mellon, 507 P.2d 628, 635 (Cal. 1973)
("The imprecise nature of a durational residence requirement which includes uninformed
old time resident candidates but excludes well informed new resident candidates is clear.
It is simply too crude and imprecise an instrument to effectuate this state interest."). Or,
as a Michigan state court judge colorfully wrote, "Mere presence in a community is no
more indicative of civic consciousness than mere presence at a crime scene is indicative
of guilt." Barrow v. City of Detroit Election Comm'n, 836 N.W.2d 498, 515 (Mich. App.
2013) (Stephens, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28
Cf. Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D. Del. 1972) (noting in 1972
that "the available news coverage in the community is clearly sufficient to provide a
would-be mayor with the resource material necessary to become relatively well informed
in substantially less than [the residency requirement of] five years").
29
Tom McGeveran, A 'Parksand Recreation' Guide to the Local Media Universe,
PM),
available
at
(Sept.
20,
2012,
2:06
CAPITAL
N.Y.
media/2012/09/6537363/parks-and-recreationhttp: //www.capitalnewyork.com/article/
guide-local-media-universe, archived at http://perma.cc/PY4G-JV5D (explaining the
newspapers printed in Pawnee).
30 A website for the fictional City of Pawnee, Indiana, from the television show
Parks and Recreation can be found here, available at http://www.pawneeindiana.com/
home.shtml, archived at http://perma.ccl4BQK-JHHW.
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Additionally, a campaign will serve to inform the candidate
about the issues. Even if Donaghy initially lacks any knowledge
of Pawnee and lacks the ability to easily gather information
about Pawnee prior to entering a campaign for city council, the
campaign itself will help acquaint him with the problems and
needs of Pawnee's populace. Indeed, an election campaign can
serve as much as a bottom-up dialogue from constituents to
candidates as it can serve as a top-down delivery of solutions to
constituent problems from candidates. If Donaghy truly wants to
get elected, he's going to have to spend some time learning about
the issues that impact the electorate and, in doing so, will
undoubtedly become educated about the problems and needs of
Pawnee's electorate. 31 If Donaghy does not become properly
acquainted with the issues, that will be a liability in
his campaign. 32
In fairness, there's no question that, on average, a person
who resides geographically closer to an area for a bit of time is
likely to have a higher knowledge of issues in that area than a
person who resides further away. But candidates are not
average persons. Candidates are a select group of persons who
have opted to pursue political office. When a person opts to
pursue political office, they are going to apprise themselves of
the issues-or else they will not be able to effectively campaign.
While there could be a slight incremental advantage to
candidates who have resided in a jurisdiction for a longer timethat incremental advantage would be just that, slight. Moreover,
any incremental advantage garnered from knowing the issues
could be negated by the notion that a person from outside the
geographic area might bring a fresh perspective to the issues at
hand. Finally, if the incremental advantage is more than slight,
presumably such a sizeable advantage will come to the fore
during a campaign and the unknowledgeable candidate will be
defeated, which makes a residency requirement irrelevant.
3' Cf. Thompson v. Mellon, 507 P.2d 628, 635 (Cal. 1973) (rejecting a residency
requirement of two years and noting the government "failed to demonstrate that the
election process is inadequate to weed out incompetent, unknowledgeable candidates,
insensitive to, and unaware of, the best needs of the community").
32 See David McCabe, Scott Brown Gets into Geography
Spat, THE HILL (Oct. 30,
2014, 11:05 PM), available at http://republicanpartyconvention.com/blogs/ballotbox/senate-races/222414-scott-brown-flubs-geography-in-debate,
archived
at
http://perma.ccIT279-KJ2T (describing how Scott Brown, who had been criticized as a
carpetbagger in his New Hampshire Senate bid, stumbled in a debate when asked about
issues facing a specific New Hampshire county).
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b. Voter knowledge of candidates.
In addition to ensuring candidates have knowledge of their
constituency,
another
potential
benefit
of residency
requirements is that they provide voters with the ability to gain
knowledge about a candidate's abilities and character-and,
again, this is a benefit of residency requirements frequently
invoked by courts.

33

As the Alaska Supreme Court once wrote:

[I]t is most important that electors have a period in
which they may become familiar with the character,
habits and reputation of candidates for political office.
Modern media campaigns and "packaged" candidates
permit political hopefuls to campaign for office with little
or no direct contact with the public they seek to serve. It
is essential that voters have at least the opportunity to
have some direct knowledge of their candidates in order
to judge their sincerity and the truth of the claims which
these aspirants for public office press forward through
the media. It is a minimal requirement at best to ask a
candidate to spend one year as a part of the community
he hopes to represent in order to satisfy this need. 34

3 Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1998) (noting that a residency
requirement "enables the people of the district to gain knowledge about the candidate's
abilities and character"); Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (D.N.J. 2001)
(noting how New Jersey's one-year residency requirement for state legislative districts
could allow "the people of New Jersey the necessary opportunity to become familiar with
a potential candidate"); In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen.
Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 699 (N.J. 2012) (noting that residency requirements "ensure that
voters have time to develop a familiarity with the candidate"); MacDonald v. City of
Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D. Nev. 1993) (noting that residency requirements
"allown the voters to become familiar with the ability, views, and character of a
prospective candidate"); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (D.N.H. 1973)
(noting residency requirements "giv[e] the voters of the State an opportunity to gain by
observation and personal contact some firsthand knowledge of the candidates"); State ex
rel. Brown v. Summit County Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ohio 1989)
(noting that residency requirements "insure the voters the opportunity to become
acquainted with the candidate's ability, character, personality, and reputation"); Walker
v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85, 98 (D. Del. 1972) (three judge panel) (noting residency
requirements "provid[e] the electorate an opportunity to become acquainted with a
would-be lawmaker and to observe his intelligence, responsiveness, judgment, sense of
responsibility, temperament, character, and other qualities reasonably believed
necessary for effective leadership").
3
Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1974). As another court put it:

[I]t is true that during the course of a modern campaign candidates are
exposed to public scrutiny by the mass media. Yet even as modern
communications systems have allowed more people to be informed about a
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It is undoubtedly true that residency does provide some
additional opportunity for voters to judge the character and
abilities of a candidate. Returning to the hypothetical, the voters
of Pawnee would have had more opportunity to judge the
character and ability of long-time resident Leslie Knope than of
non-resident Jack Donaghy. This opportunity could lead to
Pawnee voters electing better candidates. But again, the
benefits would seem to be slight and do not outweigh the costs of
residency requirements.
The benefit will be slight because very few persons in the
electorate are likely to have personal knowledge (what the
Alaska Supreme Court passage above refers to as "direct
knowledge") of a candidate. In a different era of politics, voters
were perhaps more likely to have personal knowledge of
candidates. 35 At one point, maybe almost everyone did know the
governor of the state or his or her local representative or even
city council member. But the fact is'that in the vast majority of
elections-even local ones for the veritable dogcatcher-voters
will have no prior personal knowledge of the candidates based
on residency. 36

candidate in a shorter period of time, the techniques of advertising and public
relations have also enabled candidates to manipulate and control their public
image. One who lives among city residents for a substantial period of time will
usually reveal himself to his neighbors in ways which will not appear in
newspaper advertisements or televised debates. And it can safely be assumed
that his neighbors will talk to others about him. Knowing the character of a
candidate may be as important as knowing his publicly-stated views on the
issues. And of course the election process itself cannot insure that voters will
be informed about the candidates.
Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (footnote
omitted).
3
Cf. Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677, 685 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (upholding a
residency requirement for the Oklahoma legislature and noting "a paucity of television
and radio stations and a lack of daily newspapers in a large number of the rural
representative districts" such that "exposure of candidates to voters in these
representative districts must necessarily be personal and personalized").
36 As one district court noted in the 1970s:
The [residency requirement] here involved was perhaps a rational one for 1909,
when the predominantly rurally-oriented legislature conceived of cities as
larger towns-towns in which most of the inhabitants knew each other. We
take judicial notice of what any city dweller knows, that tenants in a high-rise
dwelling building know very few of their fellow tenants, and that even in
single-family dwelling neighborhoods, acquaintanceship rarely encompasses
more than persons living within the city block. Taking into account the
realities of city life and the problems of the cities we can only conclude that the
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To some extent it's possible that instead of direct knowledge
of a candidate, voters will obtain indirect knowledge-through
friends and neighbors or through local media-if the candidate
has been a resident of the community. However, such indirect
knowledge is secondhand and differs little in substance from the
"[m]odern media campaigns" derided by the Alaska Supreme
Court. Finally, the vast majority of information about character
and ability acquired by voters will come from the campaign. At
that point, voters will presumably receive messages both pro
and con in relation to a candidate's abilities and character.
Let's put all this in the context of our hypothetical involving
Jack Donaghy's bid for Pawnee City Council. Even if Donaghy
resided for a year in Pawnee prior to campaigning for office, it's
unlikely that he's going to personally know a large number of
residents and that many are going to know very much about his
habits, ability, and character. Instead, what will presumably
happen is that Donaghy will meet many people through his
campaign. Moreover, voters are likely to get their information
and form their opinion of Donaghy through his campaign
materials and other campaign events (e.g., public forums).
Finally, if Donaghy has flaws in his character and reputation,
his opponent will likely highlight those flaws to the electorate.
Put simply, it's unlikely a residence requirement provides much
more information about a candidate's character and abilities
than a campaign does.
c. Prevent carpet bagging.
A third possible benefit of residency requirements-and
another widely cited justification courts recognize-is to prevent
carpet bagging. 37 Now, apart from being a slur that stops all
three year residency requirement has neither logic, reason nor experience to
support it.
Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698, 700-01 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Allow me to indulge
in a personal reflection on this point. I live in Zionsville, Indiana, a town with a
population of approximately 24,000 persons. Rarely do I personally know a candidate on
the ballot. And the few candidates who I have known, I have only had a most perfunctory
knowledge of.
3
Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting how New
Jersey's one-year residency requirement for state legislative districts could prevent
"political carpet bagging"); MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.
Nev. 1993) (noting that residency requirements "inhibit[] individuals who do not have a
significant stake in the interest of the community from becoming candidates"); In re
Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 700
(N.J. 2012) ("The one-year [residency] requirement further ensures that members of the
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conversation and counterargument, the term "carpetbagger"
would seem in this context to mean that we are trying to prevent
a person from running for office and manipulating that office for
private gain. 38 Perhaps put into the context of our hypothetical,
Pawnee's ordinance helps prevent Jack Donaghy from running
in Pawnee and then steering all of the city contracts to
Kabletown-a business Donaghy works for. Or, perhaps,
Pawnee's ordinance prevents Donaghy from using Pawnee as a
stepping-stone to furthering his own political career. In this
way, Pawnee's ordinance seems to prevent the use of Pawnee's
government for the private gain of Donaghy and/or Kabletown.
But yet again, the benefits of using a residency requirement
as a proxy for the prevention of misappropriating political office
for private gain would seem to be slight. For starters, one would
presume that a political campaign would typically bring to light
issues related to carpet bagging. During the course of a
campaign, Donaghy's opponent for Pawnee City Council would
presumably alert the electorate that Donaghy is an outsider
seeking office for impure motives. Indeed, one suspects that
Donaghy's opponent will use the term carpetbagger during the
campaign. In essence, a campaign seems likely to bring issues of
carpet bagging to the electorate's attention. 39
The notion of carpet bagging might also serve as a proxy for
the argument that an "outsider" will just buy his or her way to
political office against an underfunded resident and that the
General Assembly have a stake in the communities they represent. . . . By requiring that
members of the General Assembly live within their district for at least one year before
the General Election, the constitutional requirement elicits from Assembly members a
genuine demonstration of commitment to their constituents and of their dedication to the
important public offices they hold."); Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319,
1337 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("The city's [residency requirement] law also serves the interest
in protecting the citizens from 'raiders' who are not seriously committed to the interests
of the community. It is fair to assume that the longtime resident has had a stake in the
community and has not moved there merely to further his own political career.").
3 Merriam-Webster defines carpetbagger as a "nonresident or new resident who
seeks private gain from an area often by meddling in its business or politics."
Carpetbagger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER

ONLINE

DICTIONARY,

available at

http://www.

merriam-webster.com/dictionary/carpetbagger, archived at http://perma.cc/PX3Z-E3FK.
3 For instance, in the 2014 New Hampshire Senate race between Jeanne Shaheen
(D) and Scott Brown (R), one of the Democrats' primary campaign messages was that
Brown, who had recently moved to New Hampshire, was a carpetbagger. Sabrina
Siddiqui, Scott Brown Tackles New Hampshire Geography in Final Debate, HUFFPosT
POLITICS (Oct. 30, 2014, 8:52 PM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/10/30/scott-brown-new-hampshire n_6079418.html, archived at http:Hlperma.
cc/F4CN-PUBY (noting that "Brown's campaign has been dogged by charges of carpetbagging").
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outsider will not serve the interests of the electorate as well as
the "insider" would. Assuming voters are not smart enough to
see through this (more on the competency of the electorate in
this realm later), the assumption underlying this type of
objection is that the person from outside with a lot of money is
inherently not as likely to serve the electorate's interest as the
less-monied resident. 40 But, in this scenario, is it the money or
the geography that is the problem? In other words, nothing
prevents a well-resourced resident from tricking the electorate
into thinking that the candidate actually has the polity's best
interests at heart. And there's no reason to think that an underfunded resident would not similarly use electoral office for his or
her own personal gain.4 1
One might construct a "worst-case" scenario where an
outside interest runs a candidate (or a slate of candidates for a
governing body) who is a highly-funded non-resident who will
not have the electorate's best interests in mind. But how often is
this going to occur? Will it occur more often than situations
where incumbent politicians use residency requirements to stifle
legitimate opposition? 42 In addition, the same scenario could
occur with resident candidates. In other words, a wealthy
outside interest could sponsor a candidate or slate of candidates
of residents who do not have the best interests of the polity in
mind. Indeed, one suspects that the latter strategy would be
much better for achieving the desired result because of a general
hostility that would likely exist against non-resident
candidates
specially
non-resident
candidates
funded
by outsiders. 43
Moreover, the post-Reconstruction period-from which the
term carpetbagger emanates-lies in the distant past. While
corruption and profit from political office may occur-for
instance, consider the two former Attorneys General of Utah
who were recently arrested on corruption charges 44 or the recent
40 My sense is that this objection only comes to the fore where there is an imbalance
of resources. Where candidates have the same resources, it seems all voters will be
equally well informed of the carpet bagging issue.
41 To the extent a residency requirement prevents carpet bagging
because it
provides the ability of voters to know the character of the candidate, then prevention of
carpet bagging does not add more to the mix.
42 See discussion infra Parts I.B.3. and H.A.
43

Infra notes 83-85.

44 Matt Pearce, Two Former Utah Attorneys General Arrested on Bribery Charges,

356

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL

FORUM

[ 2015

track record of Illinois governors 45-I don't know why corruption
would be higher among non-resident candidates and
officeholders. What is it about being a resident in a geographic
area that would make a particular candidate less likely to
manipulate office for political gain? One could presume that a
geographic resident might have to live with policies and
decisions that do not serve the electorate (e.g., high crime rates
or poor educational systems). But it does not seem to me that
being geographically situated amounts to a strong proxy for
being a politician who will not engage in outright corruption or
even softer forms of self-dealing.
To some extent the empirical question is this: Would a
world without residency requirements be a world in which more
political corruption would occur or where more candidates will
be elected who do not have the best interests of their
constituents at heart? I don't think a world without residency
requirements would lead to a statistically significant increase in
either of these negative results. Moreover, there does not appear
to be any support for the proposition that residency
requirements reduce corruption.4 6
2. A more realistic assessment of the benefits identified by
the courts.
So far, I have discussed the benefits of residency
requirements primarily through the lens of the hypothetical
involving Jack Donaghy and the City of Pawnee, but the
hypothetical is probably far-fetched and does not represent the
L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2014, 4:56 PM), available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/
nationnow/la-na-nn-utah-attorneys-general-20140715-story.html,
archived at http: //
perma.cc/7R6Z-TYP6.
45 Claire Suddath, A Brief History of Illinois Corruption, TIME (Dec. 11, 2008),
available
at
http: lcontent.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1865681,00.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7V3B-UV8G.
16 Speaking of empiricism, one of the common links of all three benefits
frequently
cited by courts is that no empirical evidence exists to support the notion that residency
requirements actually achieve these benefits. Having read numerous judicial opinions
involving challenges to residency districts as unconstitutional, I have yet to encounter
any empirical support for the notion that residency requirements actually accomplish
the ends governments hope to achieve through their use. Indeed, a 2011 federal court
opinion implies that little, if any, empirical support exists for any of these rationales.
Lewis v. Guadagno, 837 F. Supp. 2d 404, 414 (D.N.J. 2011) ("Central to the resolution of
th[e] question [of whether residency requirements violate the Equal Protection Clause] is
not whether [the government has] . . . articulated a sufficient empirical justification for
the provision's existence and application.") (emphasis added).
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likely scenario where residency requirements prevent a
candidacy. The hypothetical posits a situation where a person
(Jack Donaghy) with seemingly no connection at all to a
community (the City of Pawnee) seeks office. Yet the more likely
scenario is that a candidate with some past or pre-existing
connection to a community would seek to run and get excluded
by a residency requirement. For instance, take a situation in
Missouri where a candidate who grew up in Knox County, still
had parents and siblings who worked there, and had visited on
holidays and weekends was precluded from running for county
judge due to a one-year residency requirement. 4 7 Indeed, it
makes intuitive sense that it will likely be the extremely rare
instance where a candidate will offer his or herself to a
constituency to which he or she does not at least have some loose
roots or connection. 4 8
I envision that there are generally (though not exclusively)
four types of persons who would want to run for office but would
be precluded by residency requirements. First would be a person
who does not reside within the geographic area but has strong
name recognition within the area either because they are
famous or used to reside there. 49 Second would be a person who
4 Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d 461, 463-67 (Mo. 2002). As another example of a
residency requirement blocking a candidate with a strong connection to a community,
consider the case of John Sununu, who later became Chief of Staff to President George
H. W. Bush. Sununu attempted to run for State Senator after having been Chairman of
the Salem, New Hampshire, Water and Sewer Planning Committee, Chairman of the
Salem Planning Board, and having been elected to represent Salem in the New
Hampshire General Court. Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (D. N.H. 1974)
(three-judge panel). However, Sununu was barred from appearing on the ballot as a
State Senate candidate because he had resided in New Hampshire for a little less than
five years and New Hampshire had a seven-year residency requirement for State
Senators. Id. at 1288-89.
48 Even though there is no requirement that candidates for British Parliament
reside in their constituencies (i.e., single-member districts), less than 10% of these
constituencies do not have any candidates who reside within their boundaries. Kai
Arzheimer & Jocelyn Evans, Geolocation and Voting: Candidate-Voter Distance Effects
on Party Choice in the 2010 UK General Election in England, 31 POL. GEOGRAPHY 301,
303 (2012).
4 One scenario where residency requirements seem to play a role is when
celebrities try to return home or find a favorable locale to run for office. See, e.g., Roger
Alford, Can Ashley Judd Represent Kentucky with a Tennessee Address?, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (March 19, 2013), available at http: /www.csmonitor.com/USA/LatestNews-Wires/2013/0319/Can-Ashley-Judd-represent-Kentucky-with-a-Tennessee-address,
archived at http://perma.cc/N7BM-Y93H. See also Lewis v. Guadagno, 837 F. Supp. 2d
404 (D. N.J. 2011) (durational residency requirement operating to exclude nine-time
Olympic gold medalist Carl Lewis from running for the New Jersey Senate). This might
be caused, at least in part, by the notion that only persons with some renown (broadly
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does not reside in the geographic area but who resides close to
the area-for example, a person who wants to run for Mayor of
Indianapolis but resides in a suburb of the city. Third would be a
person who lives in the geographic area but has not lived there
for long enough to meet a durational residency requirement.
Fourth would be a person who does not reside in the geographic
area but who has the resources (i.e., money and time) to create
name recognition and effectively campaign.50
In all these examples, it's not clear that residency adds
much to the mix in securing knowledgeable candidates, giving
voters the ability to judge candidates' character and ability or
preventing carpet bagging. For instance, when it comes to, say,
the ability of voters to judge a person's ability and character,
residency will likely do very little because: (1) a person who
already has name recognition had to somehow acquire that
name recognition; (2) a person who resides close to the
geographic area provides pretty much the same opportunity to
get a sense of the person's character as someone within the
geographic area; (3) a current resident provides some
opportunity for judging character, though not quite as much as a
residency requirement might provide; and (4) the purchasing of
name recognition, in and of itself, tells voters something about
the candidate's character.5 1
My point is that the more typical situation, where a person
will be excluded from running because of a residency
requirement, will involve someone who would not be much
different than a resident candidate. The typical situation would
seem to most likely involve a person who does have some
understanding of the constituency and the issues facing it, is
known by some persons in the community, and is not a
carpetbagger. Otherwise, the person is unlikely to be a
competitive candidate. 52
defined to, say, include the legendary high school football quarterback who wants to
return to his hometown as mayor) think they can overcome what would seem to be the
inherent disadvantage of lacking a current geographic connection with a jurisdiction.
50 While the hypothetical I have posed involving Jack Donaghy and the City of
Pawnee more likely represents an outlier scenario than a common one, a wealthy Jack
Donaghy might fall into this fourth category.
51
I take no position as to whether purchasing name recognition says something
either positive or negative about a candidate's character.
52 I suppose wealthy folks might seek office in places where they have no connection
and attempt to buy their way into office. But it's hard for me to think that there are
going to be many candidacies like this. For instance, is Warren Buffet, the Oracle of
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In sum, the three benefits of residency requirements
(candidate familiarity with the constituency, opportunity for
voters to appraise the candidate, prevention of carpet bagging)
that courts identify would seem to only be very slight benefits in
each of the four more realistic scenarios.
3. Other possible benefits of residency requirements.
While courts primarily focus on the three previously
mentioned benefits of residency requirements, these are not the
only benefits and justifications to consider. Residency
requirements might have the benefit of limiting the number of
candidates and preventing ballot crowding.
Residency
requirements might also provide geographic representation.
Moreover, there is a long tradition of residency requirements.
However, none of these benefits seem particularly compelling.
Residency requirements might help keep the number of
candidates in a particular election from becoming too unwieldy.
Presumably, without residency requirements, it might be
possible for so many non-serious candidates to appear on a
ballot that campaigns cannot get their voice heard and voters
cannot possibly gather information about the election. 53
Returning to the hypothetical involving the City of Pawnee, the
problem might be that if we let Jack Donaghy run without
having established residency, then Liz Lemon, Tracy Jordan,
Jenna Maroney, and Kenneth Parcell will run as well and create
too much confusion.5 4
But residency requirements probably do little to prevent
ballot crowding in the paradigmatic scenario. It seems unlikely
that candidates from far and wide are going to descend upon
particular offices to the point of ballot crowding.5 5 Moreover,
Omaha, going to be clamoring for a seat, say, on the Miami-Dade (Florida) Board of
County Commissioners? More likely Warren would want to be, for example, Governor of
Iowa. But, in this instance, Warren has some proximity to Iowa. Moreover, one suspects
that there will be plenty of knowledge about Warren's lack of ties to Iowa and plenty of
Iowa money flowing to Warren's opponent.
5
Cf. Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Alaska 1974) (noting that residency
requirements "protect the state from frivolous candidacies"). See also Chimento v. Stark,
353 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (D.N.H. 1973) (noting residency requirements "prevent frivolous
candidacy by persons who have had little previous exposure to the problems and desires"
of the electorate).
54
See generally 30 Rock: Seasons 1-7 (NBC television broadcast 2006-2013).
1
Green v. McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (expressing skepticism
that eliminating a city's two-year residency requirement "will open the floodgates of the
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other more effective ways exist to prevent ballots from becoming
overly crowded. For most elected offices, prospective candidates
need to generate some level of grassroots support, such as by
gathering signatures of registered voters, or by putting their
money where their mouth is and paying a filing fee.5 6 These
laws, rather than residency requirements, should be used to
prevent scrums of candidates running for office. 57
Residency requirements also provide the benefit of
geographic representation. For instance, a requirement that a
person reside in a single-member district within a particular
state can ensure that a particular geographic area receives
descriptive representation in the legislature.5 8 Put into more
concrete terms, requiring a candidate (or elected official) for the
Nebraska State Legislature to reside in the Sand Hills region
of
Nebraska
ensures
that
residents
in
that
area
5 9
receive representation.

electoral process to non-residents").
56 See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972) (filing fee); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431 (1971) (signature requirement). If one accepts the notion that residency
requirements demonstrate a candidate's commitment to an electorate, I suppose it might
be possible to consider that, instead of banning non-residents outright, non-residents
demonstrate some higher commitment than resident candidates. For instance, maybe
non-resident candidates would have to gather twice as many signatures to appear on the
ballot.
' It's possible that a prohibition on running for multiple offices in multiple
jurisdictions would need to be adopted if residency requirements were eliminated.
However, some democracies allow candidates to seek office in more than one district.
LOUIS MASSICOTTE ET AL., ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME 57 (Univ. of Toronto

2004) ("Some [democracies] go so far as to allow candidates to stand in more than one
electoral district. Of course, if elected in two districts, they may keep only one seat, and a
by-election has to be held for the other.").
58 For a discussion of the possible benefits of geographical descriptive
representation, see Sarah Childs & Philip Cowley, The Politics of Local Presence: Is
There a Case for Descriptive Representation, 59 POL. STUD. 1 (2011).
5 It may be argued that residency requirements should be eliminated (or scaled
back) for voters as well. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article. However, it
seems that durational residency requirements for voters are distinct from residency
requirements for candidates for at least a couple of reasons. First, durational residency
requirements for voters tend to be shorter than those for candidates-generally no more
than 30 days. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) (implying that anything more
than a 30-day durational residency requirement for voters would be unconstitutional).
Second, it makes sense that the persons who are selecting the representatives for an area
demonstrate a geographic fidelity to a jurisdiction-that is what representation is all
about. In contrast, candidate residency requirements serve as a barrier to choice of the
persons who seek representation. Put differently, voters are first-order deciders in a
democracy and, therefore, it is useful to place some modest residency requirement on
first-order deciders. However, beyond that, we should not limit the choices of first-order
deciders with second-order residency requirements for candidates.
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However, this argument brings to mind the famous musings
of Chief Justice Earl Warren in Reynolds v. Sims: 60 "Legislators

represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests." 61 The
important thing in terms of geographic representation is that
the voters of the geographic area achieve representation6 2 and,
as will be discussed, 63 it should be for them to decide whether
(and how much) the geographic residence of the candidate
matters to their representational needs. 64
One other possible justification for residency requirements
would be tradition. The United States Constitution contains a
residency requirement.6 5 Many state constitutions contain
residency requirements.6 6 And many state laws containing
residency requirements have been in existence for some time.
Indeed, courts sometimes point to the longstanding nature of a
residency requirement as a justification for denying an equal
67
protection challenge to a residency requirement.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 562.
An example of why the electorate should matter more than geography comes from
a 1970 case in Alabama. In Hadnott v. Amos, a lawyer who had worked closely with the
African-American community in Alabama was barred from running as a candidate in a
particular judicial circuit because he could not meet the durational residency
requirement. Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107, 130 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). The particular judicial circuit was predominantly African American. Id. And
the only other potential candidates who resided in the judicial circuit (because being a
lawyer was a requirement for office) were lawyers who were white and did not have
strong connections with the African-American community. Id. Thus, African-American
voters lost a chance to elect a person who might well have represented their interests
better even though that person did not live in perfect geographic proximity. All this is to
emphasize that the important thing for an electorate, such as the one in Hadnott, may
not be geographic representation but rather interest representation and, as will be
argued soon, the voters should decide rather than electoral regulations making this
decision for them.
63 Infra Part I.B.4.
6
Admittedly, there may actually be one flavor of residency requirements that
makes sense from the perspective of providing geographic representation. This would be
the use of residency districts with an at-large method of election. Such a method of
election seems specifically targeted at ensuring candidates come from diverse
geographical areas rather than ensuring representation of a particular geographic
constituency because candidates elected from residency districts are elected at large by
the entire polity.
65 Supra note 8.
66
Supra note 14.
67 Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1216-17 (D.N.H. 1973) (waxing poetic
about the deep historical roots of residency requirements in the New Hampshire
constitution); Brewster v. Johnson, 541 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ark. 1976) (justifying a decision
to subject a residency requirement to rational basis scrutiny in part because of the long
6

6'
6'
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I won't tarry too long in response to tradition as a
justification for residency requirements for several reasons.
First, this seems like a makeweight argument in favor of
residency districts (at least from the perspective of the judicial
decisions in the area). Second, my perspective is that tradition
alone should not serve as a justification for an election law, and,
more importantly, you can find language in Supreme Court
opinions to support that notion. 68 Or, as Oliver Wendell Holmes
said, "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."6 9 In other
words, while tradition might serve as a partial justification for
staying with a particular electoral regime, it should not be the
sole (or even primary) reason for staying with a particular
electoral regime.
Third, the United States Constitution and federal laws
contain fairly weak residency requirements when it comes to
candidates for some of the highest offices of the land. 70 Senators
and Representatives need only be an inhabitant of the State
from which they are elected at the time of election. In other
words, there is no durational residency requirement. Moreover,
while members of the United States House are required to be
elected from single-member districts, there is no requirement
that those Representatives reside in the single-member district
from which they are elected. 7 ' In short, at the very least "the
federal Constitutional traditions can only support arguments for
limited residency requirements." 72

history of residency requirements in federal and state constitutions); State ex rel. Gralike
v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70, 76 (Mo. 1972) (upholding residency requirement based on
history of use in federal and state constitutions); In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen.
Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 692 (N.J. 2012) (describing New
Jersey's constitutional residency requirement as dating back to "the earliest days of the
Republic").
6
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (noting that disparities of population
among legislative districts could not be justified by "history alone").
6
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). See
also Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., quoting Holmes).
7o Interestingly, from a comparative perspective, it appears that "[t]he vast majority
of democracies do not impose any such [residency] requirement." Louis MASSICOTIE ET
AL., ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME 57 (Univ. of Toronto 2004).
71 2 U.S.C. §2c (requirement of single-member districts); Mogk
v. City of Detroit,
335 F. Supp. 698, 699 (E.D. Mich. 1971) ("For the office of representative in Congress
there is . . . [no requirement] that he be a resident of the district he represents.").
72 In fairness, the United States Constitution does contain a fairly
lengthy (14-year)

residency requirement for President. U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 1, cl.

5.
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So even if we look outside the primary benefits of residency
requirements noted in judicial opinions to other potential
justifications-reducing ballot crowding, geographic diversity,
and tradition-the positive case for residency requirements
remains quite weak.
4. Does the electorate need the slight benefits of residency
requirements?
There
are several possible benefits of residency
requirements, but let's think for a moment about the group of
people whom residency requirements are designed to benefitthe electorate. 73 (We'll put aside for one moment the notion that
residency requirements serve to protect incumbent political
players-an idea to be developed later.)74 Here, it's important to

ask whether the electorate needs the slight benefits of residency
requirements. The answer is no.
Ultimately, many, if not all, of the benefits of residency
requirements seem to boil down to an attempt to protect the
electorate. The "Big Three" benefits of residency requirementsfamiliarity with issues of the constituents, time to assess the
character of the candidates, and prevention of carpetbaggingdistill down to the notion that voters will be unable to do these
things adequately without residency requirements. But is there
good reason to think the electorate will be unable to perform
these functions?
In arguing for the capability of the voters, I think it's
generally safe to assert the default position of American
democracy that the voters should decide which candidate best

7
I suppose one could plausibly assert that residency requirements protect
candidates from engaging in fruitless campaigns-that a candidate who does not reside
in a particular geographic area cannot possibly learn the issues or get to know the
electorate well enough to seriously contend for the office. Again, returning to our
hypothetical election, Pawnee's residency requirement protects Jack Donaghy from
spending time, energy, and money on a campaign that is likely doomed from the outset.
This seems silly, though. There may be instances where we want to protect individuals
from their own poor choices, but this does not seem like one of them. If Jack Donaghy, or
any other candidate, wants to seek elective office and it seems like a fruitless endeavor,
why should a government regulation stop them? Political candidates always run at their
own peril and there doesn't seem to be a strong reason to protect fruitless long-distance
candidacies as opposed to fruitless candidacies from those who meet residency
requirements. To say that these laws protect candidates from themselves is, I suppose,
plausible, but seems somewhat of a stretch.
1 Infra Part II.A.
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represents their interests.75 Indeed, several courts in deciding
the constitutional fate of residency requirements have
recognized that the power to judge candidate qualifications
should presumptively reside with the voters. 76
In general, voters determine the qualifications of
candidates-their understanding of the issues, their character,
and their sincerity-by learning about the candidates during
campaigns. The question then becomes: Will a campaign be an
inadequate method for voters to judge "outsider" candidates
absent a residency requirement? Obviously, I think the answer
is negative. A candidate's connection to a community, character,
and sincerity due to a lack of geographical connection would
seem to be something that voters could easily understandunlike, say, a candidate's views on Middle East foreign policy or
a health care law. Voters can put a candidate's physical location
into proper perspective and do not need a residency requirement
to assist in this understanding.
Of course, it's possible I am presenting too naive a view of
politics in the way that courts somewhat naively presume jurors
follow instructions.7 7 After all, some voters will be uninformed
about the candidates for whom they are voting-particularly in
a local election. And it's also possible the issue of residency could
become muddied in an election such that voters lack complete
information about the issue. But the fact that some voters may
be totally uninformed about the candidates should not present
much of a hurdle. Voters who are totally uninformed should,
" Cf. Dow, supra note 2, at 1533-34 ("A candidate qualification restriction is
something of a philosophical curiosity because it would seem that the purpose of a
popular election is to permit a majority (or, in some cases, a plurality) of voters to select
a candidate whom they believe is the most qualified individual interested in a particular
office.").
76 Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) ("The decision as to
whether a candidate is sufficiently familiar with the city and its problems to effectively
wield power as Mayor should be left to the voters."); Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883, 885
(6th Cir. 1972) ("[In our representative form of government, the voters are the arbiters
of the suitability of candidates for public office."); Headlee v. Franklin County Bd. of
Elections, 368 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (S.D. Ohio 1973) ("Whether or not a candidate has the
necessary skill and knowledge of the community is a question ultimately for the voters to
decide."). See also Dow, supra note 2, at 1534 ("Theoretically, candidate qualifications
are unnecessary because voters can judge for themselves the best candidate, affording
appropriate weight to any fact that could be the subject of a candidate qualification
law-and a durational residence requirement can block the most popular candidate.").
" Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.").
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essentially, be casting random votes, and there is no reason to
think that random voters will systematically skew an election in
favor of one candidate or another. Even in an election where
two-thirds of the voters are totally uninformed and vote
randomly, these random voters should cancel each other out and
informed voters will ultimately be the deciders of the election.7 8
Moreover, the notion that local voters would tend to be less
informed may be a myth. One study noted that voters at lowturnout suburban elections tended to be more issue-driven than
voters in other types of elections.7 9
Not only is a candidate's lack of geographic residency
something voters can easily understand, it would likely be
something that would not fall beneath the radar screen of a
campaign. When a candidate lacks a geographic connection to a
community, it seems likely that the candidate's opponent will
make that an issue (and, perhaps, a cornerstone issue) in the
campaign. Indeed, courts recognize that this is a likely outcome
when a candidate lacks as much geographic connection with a
place as her opponent.8 0 As one federal district court noted:
The basic scheme of any election system . . . is designed

first, to identify and expose to public scrutiny those who
come forward as candidates, and ultimately to select from

78 In partisan elections, it is possible voters will make
decisions based upon
partisan affiliation, but there is not anything wrong with that. Put more concretely, if a
Republican constituency wants to elect a Republican "outsider", so be it. Presumably, a
Republican "insider" could run in the primary and if informed Republican primary voters
want to elect the outsider that should be their choice. Of course, in places without a
primary system, the voters may not be able to decide on the candidate in a partisan
primary. But, in that instance, the general electorate can opt for an "insider" Democratic
or Independent candidate over the "outsider" Republican.
7 J. Eric Oliver & Shang E. Ha, Vote Choice in Suburban Elections, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 393, 404 (2007) ("[S]uburban voters exhibit very high levels of interest and
involvement in local affairs. Among this group of active participants, vote choice is
driven more by specific issue concerns than either subjective impressions of candidates
or knee-jerk adherence to party positions.") (emphasis in original).
so Henderson v. Fort Worth Indep. School Dist., 526 F.2d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1976)
("[Tjhe power to make necessarily subjective discriminations on the basis of background,
experience, or political philosophy rests with the voters. . . . It can be assumed that
opposing candidates will bring deficiencies in any of these areas to the attention of the
voters."); Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883, 885 (6th Cir. 1972) ("Whether a candidate has
the ability to carry out the duties of a particular city office, even though he arrived in
[the city] less than two years prior to election day, is a matter for consideration by the
voters in choosing between candidates running for that office. Opposing candidates
undoubtedly will bring this deficiency, if it be one, to the attention of the electorate in
the course of campaigning.").
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them those who shall hold public office. Generally the
time table of the state election machinery will suffice to
accomplish the first objective. It is a matter of common
knowledge that those who seek public office go to
considerable effort and expense to secure exposure, and it
may be safely assumed that opponents in an election race
will seek out and make known the shortcomings of their
opposition and assert their own superior qualifications
for a particular post. If a short sojourn in the community
is considered to be a disqualification the electorate may
voice its sentiment at the ballot box.8
Put simply, residency requirements are unnecessary because
information about a candidate's lack of geographic connection
will be forced out during the campaign.
Lack of information about residency could be a problem, but
so could irrational behavior in the face of information, as
humans do not always act rationally. 82 However, it seems more
likely that voters will irrationally focus on a candidate's lack of
geographic connection as a reason to not support a candidate,
rather than the other way around. There is psychological
research to support the idea that intergroup bias-"the
systematic tendency to evaluate one's own membership group
(the in-group) or its members more favorably than a
nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members"-exists. 83
In simple terms, persons within a particular group are more
likely to trust, positively regard, cooperate, and empathize with
members of that same group rather than members of an

81
Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698, 701 (E.D. Mich. 1971). See also
Thompson v. Mellon, 507 P.2d 628, 637 (Cal. 1973) (Mosk, J., concurring) ("We cannot be
so naive as to believe absence of durational residence requirements will automatically
catapult uninformed candidates into public office. Inevitably time in the jurisdiction will
be a significant issue in local political campaigns. The 'life-long resident' of the
community will tout his superior familiarity with the problems of the area. The recent
settler will assuredly be faced with the charge he is an interloper or carpetbagger. In
most instances the candidate well tutored in community problems will be better known
by the electorate and will prevail. But if the voters exercise their franchise to reject the
life-long resident, and prefer to be represented by the newcomer, restraints imposed by a
past citizenry, presumably to prevent future folly, should not be permitted to thwart
such democratically determined result [sic].").

82

See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008).
83 Miles Hewstone et. al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 575, 576

(2002).
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outsider group.8 4 Moreover, such in-groups and out-groups are
very easy to form, so it makes sense that residency in a
jurisdiction would create such groups.8 5 Theorizing from
intergroup bias to its potential impact on elections involving
non-resident candidates, one might think that the electorate
(the in-group) will generally already be biased against nonresident candidates (members of the out-group) and that the
electorate does not need additional protections in the form of
residency requirements to prevent the electorate from
behaving irrationally.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that, all other things
being equal, voters prefer candidates who reside in closer
geographic proximity to themselves. A study of British
Parliamentary elections, where residency is not required of
candidates in constituencies (i.e., single-member districts),
showed that voters preferred candidates who lived closer to
them.8 6 Again, this suggests residency requirements provide less
of a benefit than might be surmised because voters are already
disinclined to support outsiders.
At bottom, the issue boils down to how much one trusts the
electoral process both generally and specifically. In general, the
question is whether one trusts the voters to get information and
properly process that information. More specifically, the
question is whether one trusts the voters to get information
about a candidate's lack of residence and to properly process
that information about non-residence. My argument and
perspective is that, at least in relation to residency, voters will
likely get sufficient information and be able to process that
information adequately (or will process that information
irrationally as a negative inference against a non-resident

Id. at 578.
Antony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 195 (2005) ("Grouping people, even on a completely
arbitrary basis such as a coin toss, leads to strong biases regarding others' assessments
of the people in the group and the way they behave toward them.")
86 Arzheimer & Evans, supra note 48, at 301 ("[I]n English constituencies,
distance
between a voter and candidates from the three main parties (Conservative, Labour, and
Liberal Democrat) does matter, even when controlling for traditional predictors of voting,
such as party feeling and incumbency advantage. This suggests that candidates living
closer to their voters enjoy a small but significant electoral advantage over rivals living
further afield, and provides further confirmation of previous research which has found
that the localism of a candidate matters to voters.").
84
8
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candidate). Thus, residency requirements are not needed for the
benefit of protecting the electorate.
In many respects, the above analysis represents a marketsbased approach to the regulation of elections. The voters are the
consumers and residency requirements represent a barrier to
entry for potential products (i.e., the candidates). While there
may be legitimate and compelling reasons to create barriers to
entry in a political market-say, for instance, to limit crowding
on the ballot, to fix a lack of information, or to fix a market
failure 8 7-residency requirements do not seem to have sufficient
justification to create a barrier to entry. Indeed, we'll talk more
about the political market later in this article.8 8
To sum up this section, one way to view the potential
benefits of residency requirements is to consider the possible
beneficiaries of such requirements. In this instance, voters could
plausibly be considered the beneficiaries. However, it would
seem residency requirements are not necessary to aid
the electorate.
5. Costs of residency requirements.
So far, the focus has been on the benefits of residency
requirements. But residency requirements come with costs. The
costs of residency requirements will generally be borne by two
groups-candidates and voters. In this section, we'll first
consider costs primarily borne by candidates and then consider
costs primarily borne by voters.
One cost of residency requirements to candidates is the
inability to run for a particular political office-even if they have
longstanding ties to a particular region. For instance, a
candidate might be a life-long resident of California, but if
California has a one-year residency requirement to live in the
state legislative district from which a candidate is elected,
anyone who moves from one district to another within a year of
the election automatically becomes ineligible to stand as a
candidate.8 9 In short, candidates lose the ability to run even in

87 I write frequently in an area where I would submit that
necessary to correct a market flaw-voting rights litigation
polarized voting exists.
8
Infra Part II.A.
8 Cf. Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166, 167 (6th Cir.
council met one-year requirement for residing in the city but

government regulation is
where proof of racially

1981) (candidate for city
could not meet one-year
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areas where they might appear to have a significant connection.
(Of course, the voters also lose an opportunity to elect that
candidate-more on that soon.)
On the other hand, it can be argued that this is a minimal
cost on a particular candidate. If a candidate cannot run for
election because of a residency requirement, a candidate merely
needs to remain in the same geographic area until the next
election comes around.90 All a residency requirement does is
require the candidate to be patient.
But the assumption here is that one election is just as good
as the next, and that's not necessarily true. Candidates most
likely run when they think the time is ripe for them electorally.
Waiting even a few years can vastly change a candidate's
prospects. Imagine, say, a Democratic candidate in 2006 versus
2010.91 Imagine also the not unlikely scenario that a candidate
might fail to meet the residency requirement for an open seat
and then have to face off against an incumbent several years
later. In politics, timing can be everything-electoral
opportunities are not necessarily fungible.
Another problem with residency requirements from the
perspective of candidates is that residency requirements can be
used as political weapons when it comes to redistricting. Here,
the focus is on a particular brand of residency requirement-one
that requires the candidate to reside in a particular singlemember district (as opposed to residing in a particular
jurisdiction, such as a state or city). 92 For instance, take what
Georgia's Democrats did with a state legislative redistricting
plan passed just after the 2000 Census. Georgia has a

requirement for residency in ward and was precluded from running for ward seat).
go Cf. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (D.N.H. 1973) (noting
that a
residency requirement merely "delays the eligibility of a candidate" until later); State ex
rel. Brown v. Summit County Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ohio 1989)
(noting that a candidate subjected to a residency requirement "is not precluded from ever
running for [office]"); Antonio v. Kirkpatrick, 579 F.2d 1147, 1149 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting
that a residency requirement "does not irretrievably foreclose a person from running for
the office").
91 November 2006 was a big year for the Democrats; November 2010 not so much.
See generally Nate Silver, Is 2014 a Republican Wave?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 3, 2014,
9:11 AM), available at http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-2014-a-republican-wave/,
archived at http://perma.cc/3D4L-RM78.
92
1 suppose a residency requirement could also be used as a political weapon
through selective deannexation of territory in which a potential competitor lives. This
would seemingly be a far less likely occurrence than the use of residency requirements as
a political weapon in redistricting.
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requirement that state legislators reside in a particular singlemember district to qualify for election. 93 To retain their
legislative majority in the face of increasing strength from
Republicans,
Democrats
would
place
two Republican
incumbents in the same district, thus ensuring that at least one
Republican incumbent would not be returning to the
legislature.9 4 Absent a residency requirement, one of these
candidates could have stood for election in a different district.
At the end of the day, candidates bear the burden of
residency requirements. However, in truth, costs borne by
candidates should probably be secondary to costs borne by the
electorate-and the biggest cost to the electorate is undoubtedly
freedom of choice. Candidate residency requirements can limit
the potential pool of choices for voters.9 5 And, as previously
discussed in this part, there do not seem to be substantial
benefits from limiting voter choice with residency requirements.
But what does a limitation on freedom of choice really
mean? What's the harm of limiting freedom of choice for
the electorate?
For starters, limiting freedom of choice means limiting
competition. A problem with residency requirements is that they
often seem to be wielded by political opponents as a means of
stifling competition. 96 Take, for example, a case from the 1970s
in Oklahoma where an incumbent member of the State House
used a residency requirement to prevent an opponent from
appearing on the ballot.9 7 Or take, as another example, the loser
of a judgeship election in Tennessee successfully challenging the
residency status of the victor. 98 Or, take, as a final example, an
9

See supra note 11.

94

CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, REDISTRICTING: THE MOST POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN

AMERICA 160 (2010). Cf. In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen.
Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 704-05 (N.J. 2012) (holding open the possibility of a successful as
applied equal protection challenge if a candidate had been drawn out of a legislative
district by a redistricting that took effect less than one year prior to the general election
where the state had a one year district residency requirement).
9
In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40
A.3d 684, 695 (N.J. 2012) (durational residency requirements "have a significant indirect
effect on the voter's freedom of choice") (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Cf. Zeilenga v. Nelson, 484 P.2d 578, 581 (Cal. 1971) ("[A five-year residency
requirement] is a built-in device to prevent competition against the county's oldtimers
for the office of supervisor.").
9
Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677, 679 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (three-judge panel).
98 Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tenn. 1974); see also Barrow v. Detroit
Election Comm'n, 836 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Mich. App. 2013) (residency challenge to
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Arizona legislative candidate who hired a private investigator to
trail an opponent to establish that the opponent did not actually
reside in the legislative district. 99 One suspects that often when
a challenge is made to a candidate's residency 0 0-whether it be
at the national, state, or local level-the challenge emanates
from political opponents who either have been defeated or
by the
might be defeated
that
they
are
afraid
challenged candidate. 101
Limiting freedom of choice to those who have resided within
the geographic area also means limiting ideas and perspectives.
Persons who have resided in a place for a longer time are less
likely to have the fresh perspective of an outsider. They also
may be stuck in the established order of a locale.
Limiting freedom of choice also may mean a lower quality of
candidates for the voters to choose from. For example, let's take
the metropolitan area in which I reside-Indianapolis.
Indianapolis is a city of a little more than 800,000 persons,1 02
but lies in a Metropolitan Statistical Area more than double its
size (1.75 million persons). 103 Indianapolis is electing a mayor in
2015, and it's conceivable that there are excellent candidates of
all sorts of political persuasions who understand the people of
Indianapolis, are of high character, reside in the greaterIndianapolis region, and would be excellent candidates for

candidate for Detroit mayor brought by opponent); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107,
110 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge panel) (candidate trying to get opponent disqualified
for failure to meet residency requirement).
99 Joseph Kanefield, There Is No Time Like Fall During an Election Year, ARIZONA
ATTORNEY 14 (Nov. 2006).
'oo A reading of the cases in this area also reveals that a paradigmatic occurrence is
that candidates have their nominating papers rejected by a local election official. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Mellon, 507 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1973) (candidate had nominating papers
rejected by city clerk for failure to comply with residency requirement). What is unclear
in many of these cases is whether the local officials are enforcing these rules on their
own initiative or because of a request by someone else-i.e., a political rival.
101 In addition to an outright loss, a candidate making a residency challenge could be
worried that the challenged candidate will play the role of "third-party spoiler." It's also
worth noting that some challenges using residency requirements might emanate from
the notion that a candidate who does not meet the residency requirement is not "playing
by the rules."
102
Large Metropolitan Statistical Areas - Population, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, available at http: //quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/18/1836003.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/F9KB-QX7Y.
10 Indianapolis (city (balance) QuickFacts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
available at http: //www.census.gov/compendialstatab/2012/tables/12s0020.pdf, archived
at http: //perma.cc/G97Q-7KDE.
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mayor. Yet a residency requirement would prevent these
candidacies from even getting out of the gate.
So not only do potential candidates suffer from residency
requirements, but so does the electorate. And, again, this harm
does not seem to be for any significant benefit.104
6. Residency requirements while holding office: a similar
analysis or a bridge too far?
Hopefully, I've managed to convince you that residency
requirements as a condition for appearing on the ballot or being
elected should be eliminated. Now I want to take the argument
a step further and argue that residency requirements as a
condition for holding office should be eliminated as well.
To set the table for this argument, let me posit a few areas
that do not seem to merit concern. First, no concern (or at least
no concern that has not been previously discussed) exists in this
realm when a candidate who does not reside in the relevant
geographic area before the election then moves into that
geographic area. In this scenario, the candidate is meeting any
residency requirement that would be a condition of holding
office. Second, no concern exists (beyond what has been
previously discussed) when a candidate does not reside in the
relevant geographic area, the candidate makes no campaign
promise to reside in the relevant geographic area upon election,
and the electorate chooses that candidate. The voters knowingly
elected an "outsider" who made no promise to become
(geographically-speaking) an "insider," and here the voters'
choice should be respected (unless something in the following
discussion suggests otherwise).
The problem scenario in this realm would seem to be what
one might term the "residency bait-and-switch." This can
happen when a candidate was a resident of a geographic area

104
There are also potential systemic costs related to enforcement of residency
requirements. In a world without residency requirements, election officials would not
waste time ensuring that residency requirements are met or dealing with protests
involving residency requirements. In addition, legal challenges regarding candidate
residency requirements would go by the wayside, freeing up some civil litigation
resources. Finally, there can be a problem with selective enforcement of residency
requirements. Kerry Cavanaugh, Sen. Wright is Wrong on Racism, Right on Unfair
Enforcement of Residency Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014, 10:45 AM), available at
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-sen-wright-is-wrong-on-racism-201409
16-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4BJD-BXR8.
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prior to election but then decides to move out of the area after
the election. This can also happen when a candidate promises
during a campaign to move to the relevant geographic area upon
election but then does not honor that promise.
Again, let's put this into a concrete hypothetical. Assume
Leslie Knope is a life-long resident of Pawnee and wins election
to the Pawnee City Council. A few months after the election, her
husband, Ben, gets a great job in Washington, DC. Leslie wishes
to move with her husband to Washington, but remain a member
of the Pawnee City Council. However, Pawnee requires Leslie to
reside in Pawnee while holding a city council position. Should
Pawnee's requirement of residence while holding office
be eliminated?
One reason to require residency during a term of office
would be to prevent a candidate from reneging on either an
implicit campaign promise (the most likely scenario) or an
explicit campaign promise. With reference to our hypothetical
involving Leslie Knope moving from Pawnee to Washington, one
could view Leslie's residing in Pawnee prior to election as an
implicit campaign promise along the lines of "I am one of you
and I care about you." On the explicit promise side, let's return
to our hypothetical involving Jack Donaghy and assume he
campaigns on, in part, a promise to move to Pawnee after being
elected, but fails to honor that promise after winning election
and remains in New York City. In both scenarios, one might say
that the candidates were elected under false pretenses.
But failing to honor an implicit or explicit campaign
promise does not, in and of itself, constitute a reason for
retaining residency requirements. Politicians renege on explicit
campaign promises all the time. Think of the infamous phrase
from George H. W. Bush: "Read my lips, no new taxes." 0 5
Politicians willfully and negligently deceive all the time. And,
presumably, if that person wants to run for re-election, his or
her newfound lack of residency will be a possibly winning
campaign issue for their opponent, just as any broken campaign
promise would be. So, there must be some special reason to

05 Top 10 Unfortunate Political One-Liners, TIME (Nov. 16, 2008), available at
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1859513_1859526_185951
6,00.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8MEE-LV6A.
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prevent a politician from backtracking on an implied or explicit
promise of residency.106
Other than preventing the reneging on an implied or
explicit campaign promise, the biggest benefit of requiring
officeholders to be a resident of the relevant jurisdiction might
be to ensure that the officeholder does his or her job. On one
level, there are the obvious public functions of an officeholderattendance at legislative sessions or meetings, committee
hearings, etc. On another level, there are the less publicly
obvious functions of informal discussions with fellow
officeholders, government officials, and constituents. One might
assert that residency requirements serve as a useful proxy for
ensuring that elected officials perform the duties of the office.
However, at least in a modern age of communications and
travel, it doesn't seem all that necessary to reside in a particular
place to be an effective public servant. Instead of requiring
residence in a particular geographic area, create rules that
require attendance at the relevant public meetings. And when it
comes to public functions with a softer edge, much public
business is likely to be done by phone, email, or other electronic
communication in this day and age-things that can be done
anywhere. While it's true that an officeholder who moves away
might be a less adequate representative, an officeholder who is a
resident could be just as inadequate, and such inadequacy
should properly be a subject for the next election campaign,
rather than using a residency requirement as a proxy for
inadequate representation.
Now, it's possible that a candidate who moves away after an
implicit or explicit promise of residency may be indicating that
the candidate lacks concern for the needs and desires of the
electorate. A candidate from outside the geographic area actively
seeking office as a non-resident seems to be sending, at least
implicitly, a message that the candidate cares about that
electorate. In contrast, a candidate who leaves (or reneges on a
promise to move there) seems to be sending the opposite
message. So, I will concede that post-election residency
requirements may make more sense as a proxy for candidate

106 We should not consider it a problem if an office-holder leaves the relevant
geographic area while in office, the voters are aware of the move, and then the officeholder is re-elected. Presumably the electorate has made the decision that the
candidate's residence does not matter to them.
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concern
for
constituents
than
pre-election
residency
requirements. Moreover, at least pre-election voters can make
an immediate choice about a candidate's fidelity to the
electorate's interest whereas post-election voters may have to
wait for too long to do so.
Eliminating residency requirements for officeholders may
well take the argument too far for the comfort of most. And even
I think there is a stronger argument for residency requirements
for office holding when a candidate has made an explicit or
implicit promise regarding residency than for pre-election
residency requirements. For this reason, I urge readers not to
reject the idea of eliminating pre-election
residency
requirements because of the argument in this section.
II. ELIMINATING RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS

At this point, I hope to have convinced you that the costs of
residency requirements outweigh any slight benefits. Assuming
the correctness of this contention, a couple of questions seem
worth developing in the remainder of this article. Why do
residency requirements continue to exist? And what should be
done to eliminate residency requirements?
Why Do We Still Have Residency Requirements?

A.

There are at least several reasons why residency
requirements persist in our electoral system: tradition, a lack of
longstanding legal challenges, and, most prominently, a
disincentive
for
elected
officials
to
eliminate
residency requirements.
Residency requirements
have undoubtedly
persisted
because of tradition. As discussed previously, residency
requirements of some form or another date back to the founding
of the United States and are embedded in state constitutions. 10 7
The notion that "it's always been done this way" can be a strong
driving force against change.
Another reason why residency requirements have persisted
is that legal challenges to residency requirements seem to be
relatively new on the scene. In 1973, a federal three-judge panel
noted that no court had considered the validity of a durational
107

Supra Part I.B.3. And some constitutions, including the federal constitution, are

difficult to amend.

376

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL

FORUM

[ 2015

'

residency requirement for the office of governor.1 08 In essence,
challenges to residency requirements seemed to begin in earnest
only after the seminal Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and
1970s that marked the Court's entry into the political thicket.109
Indeed, the Supreme Court has yet to provide definitive
guidance on the subject of federal constitutional challenges to
residency requirements. 1 0 Thus, one might posit that a halfcentury is not a long time in the legal system and that future
courts could be less solicitous of residency requirements.
Residency requirements also persist because no clear, wellorganized constituency exists to put sustained pressure in
opposition to residency requirements. The persons who would
most ardently oppose residency requirements would typically be
candidates who cannot qualify for the ballot due to the existence
of such requirements. However, in many instances, such
candidates will not even begin a campaign for office because
they know they cannot meet the existing residency requirement.
Moreover, it would seem in many instances, the electorate would
reject non-resident candidates, and would view residency
requirements as a non-issue. In essence, no critical mass of vocal
opponents to residency requirements exists to push for
their elimination.' 1
And even if a person was once disqualified from running for
office because of a residency requirement, once elected (after,
perhaps, residing in the geographic area long enough to meet
the requirement), little incentive exists to change the system.
The residency requirement no longer serves as a barrier to that
person's ability to hold office. Why, then, would someone waste
political energy on something that no longer impacts him or her
low
salience
among
has
an
extremely
and
likely
the electorate?112

Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1213 (D.N.H. 1973).
See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
110 Infra note 118.
n' In a way, these residency requirements are like photo identification laws. Photo
identification laws likely enjoy widespread support among the public at least in part
because most registered voters have photo identification. When it comes to residency
requirements, most serious candidates probably meet those requirements.
112
To be fair, it's possible that an incumbent officeholder would like to eliminate
residency requirements after being elected so as to be able to reside wherever he or she
wished. For instance, an incumbent officeholder might wish to move to a different
neighborhood and yet retain office in his or her district. However, I suspect there would
15o

109
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Which brings us to what seems likely to be the primary
reason why residency requirements persist: they do not impact
incumbent politicians and, in fact, serve to protect incumbent
politicians of all stripes from additional competition. The
persons who would typically have the ability to change existing
residency laws-whether they are constitutional or statutoryare incumbent politicians. But a change in residency
requirements would increase the pool of potential challengers at
the next election. 1 3 And why would any incumbent officeholder
want to increase the pool of potential challengers?
Moreover, it would seem not only that incumbent
officeholders benefit from residency requirements, but also
political elites who help work behind the scenes to elect
candidates. For instance, the local political party chairs (and
party apparatus) of both the Republican and Democratic parties
in Indianapolis likely prefer a residency requirement for the
office of mayor because it allows them to have greater control
over the candidates for office. In essence, incumbents and other
non-elected political actors of all parties prefer barriers to entry
so that they can perpetuate their own political power.
The notion that residency requirements persist because
they advantage incumbent politicians of all stripes leads to a
potential theoretical argument against residency requirements:
a "politics as markets" analysis. New York University's Sam
Issacharoff and Rick Pildes have popularized the notion that
judicial intervention in the political process should occur when
incumbent political players have acted to impede political
competition. 114 They liken elected officials and dominant parties
to a corporate managerial class and assert that those elected
generally be too high of a political price to be paid at the next election if an officeholder
tried to eliminate residency requirements for this reason. An officeholder who seems to
spurn the place where he or she resides by attempting to change laws that would allow
him or her to move away would likely face rejection by the voters at the next election.
Instead, what probably happens when an incumbent officeholder wants to move away is
that the incumbent officeholder attempts to retain some fig leaf of residency.
n3 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 522 (1997) (recognizing that "not only do incumbents have
something to gain by restricting outsider competition; they may have little to lose").
114 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, PoliticsAs Markets: PartisanLockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998) ("Where there is an
appropriately robust market in partisan competition, there is less justification for
judicial intervention. Where courts can discern that existing partisan forces have
manipulated these background rules, courts should strike down those manipulations in
order to ensure an appropriately competitive partisan environment.").
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officials and dominant parties use procedural devices to lock up
control of a governing body."t5
Thus, residency requirements would seem to fit the
underlying theory of politics as markets. Issacharoff and Pildes
note that political lockups can take the form of "[i]ncumbent
parties .

.

. deploy[ing] state authority to raise entry barriers

against potential
third-party
challengers."' 1 6
Residency
requirements-at least to the extent that they have been created
by legislative enactment-would seem to be just that. Residency
requirements create a barrier that partisans can use to prevent
outsiders from challenging them.
In the end, residency requirements, despite the minimal
benefits of such requirements, undoubtedly persist for several
reasons, but the overarching reason is likely that these
restrictions advantage incumbent political partisans.
B.

What Should Be Done About Residency Requirements?

The discussion of residency requirements thus far raises the
possibility of legal challenges to residency requirements. The
most obvious challenge to a residency requirement would be one
based on federal equal protection principles. 117 While there
might be some debate over the contours of the appropriate
framework for assessing Equal Protection Clause challenges
generally, and for assessing Equal Protection Clause challenges
to residency requirements, 1 18 I think few would doubt that any

115

As Issacharoff & Pildes note:

Like the managerial class well-known to the laws of corporate governance,
these political managers readily identify their stewardship with the interests
of the corporate body they lead. Like their corporate counterparts, they act in
the name of the entity to protect themselves against outside challenges to their
personal authority. Again, like their corporate counterparts, political managers
use procedural devices, created in their incumbent capacity, to lock up their
control.
Id. at 647.
1"

Id. at 651.

It's also possible that residency requirements raise issues related
to freedom of
speech and the right to travel. See, e.g., Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694
(D.N.J. 2001). See also Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883, 884 (6th Cir. 1972) (discussing
right to travel); Wellford v. Battaglia, 485 F.2d 1151, 1152 (3rd Cir. 1973) (same).
"s Compare Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky. 1998) (rejecting an
equal protection argument that strict scrutiny should be applied to residency
requirements and applying rational basis review) and Hayes v. Gill, 473 P.2d 872, 87779 (Haw. 1970) (applying rational basis review) with Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp.
117
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state constitutional or statutory residency requirement would
need to survive at least a rational basis review with the
government needing to present a legitimate state interest for
any residency requirement.
A court that was so inclined could undoubtedly manipulate
an equal protection analysis to strike down residency
requirements in their entirety. One could envision an opinion
that piece-by-piece picked apart the theoretical underpinnings
and rationales for residency requirements and declared them to
be unsound. One could also envision an opinion that struck
down residency districts using a politics-as-markets approachafter all, Issacharoff and Pildes' politics as markets theory
generally aims at encouraging judicial intervention in the
political marketplace to protect against lock-up activity.1 19
While I certainly would not be opposed to courts striking
down residency requirements
as a matter of federal
constitutional law, this seems unlikely to be the best route to the
elimination of residency requirements. For starters, the federal
judiciary-particularly at the Supreme Court level-seems
generally disinclined to strike down state election laws as
violative of the United States Constitution except as they may
relate to campaign finance law.1 2 0 Second, if one of the rationales
2d 691, 698 (D.N.J. 2001) (subjecting a one-year within district residency requirement
for New Jersey's state legislature to strict scrutiny) and with In re Contest of Nov. 8,
2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 699 (N.J. 2012)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a durational residency requirement). For an extended
discussion of the various approaches of federal courts, see Joseph v. City of Birmingham,
510 F. Supp. 1319, 1321-36 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
The Supreme Court has implied, but not directly held, that durational residency
requirements should be subjected to rational-basis scrutiny. See Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957, 967-68 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e upheld a 7-year durational
residency requirement for candidacy in Chimento v. Stark [by summarily affirming the
lower court] ... We conclude that this sort of insignificant interference with access to the
ballot need only rest on a rational predicate in order to survive a challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause."); Cox v. Barber, 568 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Ga. 2002) ("The United
States Supreme Court has never considered directly the validity of durational residency
requirements for candidates for public office.").
It's also worth noting an additional doctrinal wrinkle in that it's possible to have both a
facial and an as applied challenge to a residency requirement. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Guadagno, 837 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D.N.J. 2011) (involving Olympic gold medalist Carl
Lewis's attempt to get the residency requirement for New Jersey State Senate declared
unconstitutional on its face and as applied); Matthews v. City of Atlantic City, 417 A.2d
1011 (N.J. 1980) (municipal residency requirement unconstitutional as applied when it
prevented a life-long resident from running for office).
119 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 114, at 648.
120
Compare Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008)
(upholding Indiana's voter identification law) with Ariz. Free Enterprise Club v.
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for eliminating residency requirements is that the voters can
protect themselves from the evils that residency requirements
prevent, one could take the view that residency requirements
adopted by voters demonstrate that voters think they need
prophylactic prevention. In other words, if voters, say, adopted a
state constitution that provides for residency requirements, then
judges perhaps should not stand in the way of the electorate. 121
It's not my position that the judiciary should engage in a
wholesale elimination of residency districts, but there are at
least two things the judiciary should do in this realm. The first
would be to create a canon of construction that limits the
application of residency requirements and creates a strong
presumption
in
favor
of candidates
meeting
those
requirements. 122 The second would be that judges should not
enforce residency requirements when it comes to residence
within a particular single-member district of a redistricting
plan. Residency requirements related to single-member districts
within a jurisdiction can be used as a tool of partisan
oppression 23 and, thus, seem to be the least useful residency
requirements of them all.
Instead of the courts, the agent for change could be the
people. Places where popular initiative and referenda are
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (striking down portions of Arizona's campaign finance
law). See generally Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH,
U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015) (draft on SSRN) (discussing how the Supreme Court defers
to state legislatures). I suppose it's possible that residency requirements could present
an easier case for judges to intervene than other areas of election law because residency
requirements would not seem to benefit one major political party at the expense of the
other. For example, a court that strikes down voter identification laws would seem to be
favoring the Democratic Party because voter identification laws are generally supported
and adopted by Republicans. In contrast, both major political parties likely favor
residency requirements equally. Of course, that could mean that judges appointed from
both political parties would be generally inclined to uphold them.
121 See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Alaska 1974) ("Nor can
these
interests be protected by relying solely upon the electoral process itself. Voters are, in a
sense, 'consumers' of the product portrayed by the persons they elect to office. In these
days of 'packaged' media candidates, they often cannot know what is in the package until
they have made their selection and observed the utility of the product. In adopting their
constitution, the voters of Alaska chose to protect themselves from unknown deficiencies
in their candidates by imposing objective standards upon those who would hold
legislative office.").
122 Cf. Dow, supra note 2, at 1534 ("A world in which no qualifications are placed on
candidates for political office seems unlikely; however, the notion that voters should be
permitted to judge the merits of the candidates themselves is reflected in the democracy
canon, a rule of statutory construction that favors ballot access in order to enable greater
voter choice.").
123 Supra notes 92-94 and accompanying
text.
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available might be used to eliminate candidate residency
requirements to the extent possible. That said, referenda may
well meet with failure because incumbent politicians will
campaign against elimination of residency requirements and
voters might instinctively support "tradition" and laws that keep
"outsiders" at bay. Suffice to say, I am not bullish about the
imminent demise of residency requirements.
CONCLUSION

Residency requirements have been around forever, but that
does not mean they are worthy of retention. In general,
residency requirements provide limited benefits to the electorate
that do not outweigh their costs. Residency requirements should
be eliminated and, if they were, election law would serve the
electorate a little bit better.

